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Court Lets Go of the Reins:
Runaway Escrow Agent Binds
Principals to Arbitration Agreement
99 Commercial Street, Inc. v. Goldberg'
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration agreements are a step in the right direction for alternate dispute
resolution. Obviously, before a court can grant a motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to such an agreement, it must find that both parties are, indeed, bound
by that agreement.' Although a traditional contract law analysis is ordinarily used
to determine who is bound to a contract containing an arbitration provision, when
an escrow agent acting on behalf of one party to a contract binds that party to an
agreement to arbitrate, traditional contract law analysis must be altered to take into
account the extent of an escrow agent's power to bind its principals. This Note
examines the analysis as utilized by a federal court in the Southern District of
New York when confronted with such a situation and suggests that an escrow
agent, by its very nature, does not possess the ability to bind its principal to an
agreement to arbitrate a dispute with another party.
H. FACTS AND HOLDING
The underlying claim in this case arose when 99 Commercial Street, Inc. ("99
Commercial Street"), a real estate developer in New York City, and its
principals/owners Martin Kennedy and Clark McLain (together "Plaintiffs") filed
a securities violation suit against Gary Goldberg & Co., a securities broker-dealer,
and its president Gary H. Goldberg (together "Defendants").3 Defendants moved
to compel arbitration of the claims according to the terms of a customer agreement
which contained an arbitration clause.4  This customer agreement and the
circumstances surrounding its formation provide the basis for the legal question
at issue.
The events giving rise to Plaintiffs' suit began when Plaintiffs mortgaged
their homes and a building located at 99 Commercial Street in order to raise
1. 811 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
2. McAllister Brothers, Inc. v. A & S Transportation Co., 621 Fld 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. 99 Commercial Street, 811 F. Supp. at 902.
4. Id at 903.
1
Martin: Martin: Court Lets Go of the Reins:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
capital to acquire a piece of property located adjacent to the building.5 The
mortgage, with Liberty Credit Corporation ("LCC"), allowed Plaintiffs to raise
$1.3 million.6 Kennedy and McLain became involved with Defendants while
seeking advice on how to invest the mortgage proceeds while waiting for the
property to become available for purchase.7 Goldberg advised plaintiffs to invest
the proceeds into three specific funds which his company managed or owned
Following the closing of the mortgages, and pursuant to Goldberg's
instructions, McLain deposited $1 million of the proceeds with Bear, Steams &
Co. ("Bear Stearns"), Defendants' clearing house, thus creating a commercial
account (the "Commercial Account") through which investment transactions would
occur.9 Plaintiffs denied receiving any customer agreement pertaining to this
Commercial Account.'0 Further, there was no evidence of such an agreement,
except that Bear Steams routinely sends an executed customer agreement
containing an arbitration provision to its clients."
LCC and Plaintiffs placed one hundred thousand dollars of the mortgage
proceeds into an escrow account (the "Escrow Account") to "secure completion of
certain conditions" which were not yet complete at the time of the closing with
LCC.' The law firm of Steckler, Gutman, Morrisey & Murray ("Steckler &
Gutman"), LCC's attorneys, acted as escrow agent for the account. 3 Partners of
Steckler & Gutman, in their capacity as escrow agents, signed a customer
agreement with Bear Steams (the "Customer Agreement") for the eventual
investment of the money held in the Escrow Account.'4 The partners signed their
own names, but Bear Steams' records reflect that the account name was "'FBO
(for the benefit of) 99 Commercial St., Inc.""'
This Customer Agreement provided in part that all of its provisions, including
an arbitration clause, were applicable to all matters between or among the
customer [Plaintiffs], the broker [Defendant] and/or Bear Steams. Further, the
agreement provided that the customer [Plaintiffs] agreed that the broker
[Defendant] was a third party beneficiary of this Agreement, and that the terms
and conditions contained therein, including the arbitration provision, would be
applicable to all matters between or among the customer, the broker or Bear
5. Id. at 902.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id at 902-03. These three funds included: an MFS Government Market Income Trust, an
MFS Intermediate Income Trust, and a VMS Mortgage Investment Fund. Id. at 902.
9. Id at 903.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The escrow agreement specified that the money "would be held by the escrow agents
in 'one or more interest bearing account [sic] with the interest for [99 Commercial's] benefit'" The
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Steams. 6  Finally, the agreement provided that any "controversies arising
between [the customer] and Bear Steams concerning [the customer's] accounts or
this or any other agreement with Bear Stearns, whether entered prior to, on or
subsequent to the date hereof, shall be determined by arbitration."17
Plaintiffs invested the money in the Commercial and Escrow Accounts in the
funds which Goldberg suggested, and the values dropped sharply. 8 Plaintiffs
closed these accounts and commenced an action against Goldberg asserting
securities fraud and racketeering activity.' 9 Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants
"made a series of fraudulent misrepresentations" and induced them to invest the
proceeds into Defendants' funds.2°
Defendants made a motion to compel arbitration of the claims according to
the terms of the Customer Agreement signed by the escrow agents on behalf of
Plaintiffs with Bear Steams."' Defendants based their motion on the argument
that Plaintiffs were owners of the Escrow Account, and were, therefore, bound by
the Customer Agreement signed by the escrow agents, Steckler & Gutman, which
included the arbitration provision.22 Plaintiffs argued that they did not own the
Escrow Account at the time the Customer Agreement was executed or alternatively
that they did not authorize the escrow agents to execute the customer agreement
on their behalf, and as a result were not bound by the arbitration clause.23
The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and ordered Plaintiffs to submit their
claim to arbitration, by holding that a Brokerage Agreement containing an
arbitration clause signed by an escrow agent in his capacity as escrow agent for
the principal was sufficient to bind the principal/investing customer to the
agreement to arbitrate.24
IlI. LEGAL HISTORY
The legal background of this case is best thought of as a pyramid. The
pyramid on which the instant case is constructed is broad at its base with a great
deal of general case law regarding enforceability of arbitration agreements. As the
pyramid narrows, there is less case law about binding a nonsignatory to an
arbitration agreement. Even less case law exists when this topic is placed in the
context of the securities industry. Finally, the top of the pyramid provides only




19. Id at 902.
20. Id.
21. Id at 903.
22. Id
23. Id. at 904.
24. Id at 902.
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the securities arena to an arbitration agreement. Unfortunately, even an extensive
examination of these cases does not provide a clear cut answer to the question at
issue; but examined together they provide a method of reaching a logical
conclusion applicable to this question.
A. Arbitration Agreements
There can be no question that the legislature and the federal court system
stand squarely behind the resolution of claims by arbitration. 5 The Supreme
Court has interpreted Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act as "a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." 6
Moreover, any doubts as to whether an issue is arbitrable are resolved in favor of
arbitration. 2
7
The first step following a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an
agreement is for the court to. decide if the parties have, indeed, agreed to arbitrate
their claims.28 This first step is crucial because arbitration is completely
consensual and "a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute
which he has not agreed to submit.2 9 In making this initial determination, courts
deal with agreements to arbitrate as a matter of contract law.3" Therefore,
whether a party has agreed to arbitration is to be determined by ordinary contract
principles.3
B. Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements on Nonsignatory Parties
Obviously, a party's intent to be bound to an agreement to arbitrate can be
evidenced by her signature. Parties can, however, become contractually bound to
arbitrate disputes absent their own signature.32 For example, a court may pierce
the corporate veil and bind to an arbitration agreement a company which is the
"signatory's alter ego."" In addition, a nonsignatory may be bound to an
agreement to arbitrate which is "implied from the party's conduct."34 Finally,
according to contract law, a court may apply agency principles to bind a
25. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1988) [the Federal Arbitration Act]; Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction, 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
26. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (interpreting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
27. Id. at 24-25.
28. Okcuoglu v. Hess, Grant & Co., 580 F. Supp. 749, 750 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
29. Continental Group v. NPS Communications, Inc., 873 F.2d 613, 617 (2nd Cir. 1989).
30. McAlsster Brothers Inc., 621 F.2d at 522.
31. Ockuoglu, 580 F. Supp. at 750 (citing Fox v. Merrill Lynch & Co., inc., 453 F. Supp. 561,
564 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
32. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 233 (2nd Cir. 1960).
33. Interocean Ship Co. v. National Shipping and Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2nd Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
34. Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 305 (1991).
[Vol. 1994, No. 2
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nonsignatory principal to an agreement, containing an arbitration provision, signed
by the principal's agent."
In order to analyze whether a nonsignatory principal is bound to an
arbitration agreement signed by an agent, a court looks to the law of agency
within the law of contracts.36 In making this analysis, a court must decide if the
agent possessed the requisite authority to bind his principal, by examining all the
facts and circumstances of the case." An agent's authority may be actual or
apparent, implied or express." If such authority is present, then an agent's
actions within that authority will be binding on the principal.39 Therefore, if the
court can find some authority for an agent to bind a principal to an agreement
containing an arbitration provision, then the principal will be bound to that
agreement to arbitrate.
C. Application in the Securities Field
However, this examination of the law is not sufficient to answer the question
at hand. We must take this legal blueprint used to determine the enforceability of
arbitration agreements and place it in the context of brokerage agreements
containing arbitration provisions. The current standard practice in the securities
field is for investor/customers to sign a brokerage contract which governs the
investor-broker relationship and usually contains provisions for mandatory
arbitration of disputes arising out of the securities relationship.40 A series of
cases handed down by the United State Supreme Court from 1953 to 1989,
enforcing pre-dispute agreements in the securities field, reflects the expansion of
the favorable view toward such agreements.4 In fact, the holdings in two of the
more seminal cases on the topic appear to stand for the enforceability of all pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate contained in brokerage contracts.42
Such agreements to arbitrate in the securities industry, similar to agreements
previously discussed, must also be scrutinized according to ordinary contract
35. See Peoples Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Mortgage Government Securities, Inc.,
CIV. A. 87-3859, 1988 WL 59729 (May 4, 1988 E.D. La.).
36. 99 Commercial Street, 811 F.Supp. at 905.
37. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 174 (1972 & Supp. 1994).
38. 99 Commercial Street, 811 F. Supp. at 906. The necessary authority for an agent to bind
a principal may vary according to state law. The 99 Commercial Street court, a federal district court
sitting in New York, describes the requisite authority as is stands under New York law.
39. Id
40. Eileen P. Kelly, Eugene L Donahue & Lawrence S. Clark, Legal and Ethical Perspectives
on the Use of Arbitration in the Security Industry, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1311, 1311 (1992).
41. Jim Parks, Just Saying No: Avoiding Pre-dispute Agreements to Arbitrate in Securities
Cases, 1990 J. Disp. RESOL. 117, 122 (1990). Author discusses chronologically the expanding
acceptance of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate in the securities arena. Id. at 122-26.
42. Parks, supra note 41, at 127 (discussing Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987); Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
19941
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principles.43 Therefore, traditional contract defenses can be asserted to prevent
the enforcement of a contract containing an arbitration provision." Similarly, the
principles of agency law also affect the interpretation of who is bound to an
agreement to arbitrate in a securities agreement.4
As discussed above, the courts also have found different situations involving
securities transactions in which contracts containing arbitration provisions will be
enforced by and against nonsignatories. In the securities arena, a nonsignatory has
been allowed to enforce an arbitration agreement in two situations where there has
been a "meeting of the minds" on the issue.4' First, where the introducing
broker is an obvious and disclosed agent of the clearing broker with whom the
agreement was signed, the introducing broker may enforce an agreement signed
by the customer containing an arbitration provision. 47  Second, where the
introducing broker is a third party beneficiary by the language of the brokerage
agreement or some other manifestation of the parties' intent, they may also enforce
an arbitration agreed to by an investing customer.48
Often in a securities relationship, a broker will act as the agent for an
investor in a transaction with a third party such as a clearing house.49 Courts are
split in the determination of the requisite circumstances for a broker to bind an
investor to an arbitration agreement by signing the agreement as agent for the
investor."0 Certain courts have held that an investor will be bound to an
arbitration clause contained in the clearing house agreement signed by a broker.
The court in Okcuoglu v. Hess, Grant & Co., Inc.,"1 held that consent may be
implied in law because an introducing broker is deemed to be the agent of the
clearing broker with whom the investor entered into agreement.5 2 Because the
parties in Okcuoglu conducted themselves in accordance with these arrangements
for a five year period, a failure to specifically mention the introducing broker in
the customer agreement did not prevent the enforceability of the arbitration clause
in claims against the introducing broker.53 Similarly, the court in Nesslage v.
43. Okcuoglu, 580 F. Supp. at 750; Parks, supra note 41, at 133 (quoting the Federal Arbitration
Act, which holds in part that "all agreements to arbitrate [are] 'valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'").
44. Parks, supra note 41, at 133. Author lists possible traditional contract defenses such as
unconscionability because a contract of adhesion, fraud in the inducement, lack of valid offer or
acceptance, mistake, misunderstanding, or unauthorized modification. Id at 133.
45. Okcuoglu, 580 F. Supp. at 750 (case involving an introducing broker acting as agent for
investor in transactions with clearing house).
46. Mowbray v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 795 F.2d 1111, 1116 (1st Cir.
1986).
47. Okcuoglu, 580 F. Supp at 751.
48. Nesslage v. York Securities, Inc., 823 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1987).
49. See, e.g., Nesslage, 823 F.2d 231; Okcuoglu, 580 F. Supp. 749.
50. See supra, notes 48-49 and accompanying text; supra, notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
51. 580 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
52. Shaffer v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 756 F. Supp. 365, 367 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citing Okcuoglu,
580 F. Supp. at 750).
53. Okcuoglu, 580 F. Supp. at 751.
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York Securities, Inc., 4 determined that all of the parties involved intended for the
agreement between the clearing broker and the investor to apply to the introducing
broker as a third party beneficiary." In addition, in a slightly different situation,
where the party, who actually signed the agreement, trying to enforce the
arbitration provision was an employee of the brokerage company, the court held
that "[a]cts by employees of one of the parties to a customer agreement are equally
arbitrable as acts of the principals as long as the challenged acts fall within the
scope of the customer agreement."56
There are courts, however, that refuse to enforce such agreements, signed on
behalf of an investor, absent evidence of actual intent on the part of the investor
to be bound by an agreement to arbitrate with a particular party."' The court in
Mowbray v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden,58 held that an arbitration
provision involves important procedural rights and is not an obvious incident to
an introducing broker's power as agent. 9 Following this reasoning, the court in
Shaffer v. Stratton'" held that the power to compel arbitration is not a part of an
introducing broker's power absent a "substantial factual showing that the investor
knowingly consented to such an exercise of power."'" Thus, while agreements
to arbitrate claims in the complex securities arena are generally enforceable, there
is a split of authority as to a investor's ability as a nonsignatory to enforce, rely
or be a party to such an agreement.
D. Power of an Escrow Agent to Bind a Principal
to an Arbitration Agreement
This analysis, however, still does not complete the necessary analysis for the
situation in the instant case. We must now make a transition to the topic of an
escrow agent's powers in a securities relationship. The majority of case law
applicable to escrow agents addresses the extent of the escrow agent's duties and
liability. One Florida court discussing the sources of an escrow agent's duties
states in part that:
The law of escrow does not fall neatly within the established rules of
either contract, agency or trust. The law of escrow is complicated
primarily by the fact that the escrow agent or depositary provides a
service to at least two parties with potential or actual adverse interests.
54. 823 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1 987).
55. Id at 233.
56. Scher v. Bear Steams & Co., 723 F. Supp. 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
57. See Mowbray, 795 F.2d at 1117; Shaffer, 756 F. Supp. at 369; Wilson v. S.H. Blair & Co.,
731 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Lester v. Basner, 676 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
58. 795 F.2d 1111 (lst Cir. 1986).
59. Shaffer, 756 F. Supp. at 369 (citing Mowbray, 795 F.2d at 1117).
60. 756 F.Supp. 365 (N.D. I1. 1991).
61. Id. at 369.
1994]
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The law has struggled to place a reasonable and predictable duty upon
the third party who elects to perform this difficult task with its inherent
potential for conflict.62
An escrow agent is a special or limited type of agent.63 His or her authority
is derived from and limited to that which is established by the agreement which
created the escrow relationship." The authority from this agreement is to be
strictly construed and not extended beyond that which is expressly stated or that
which is "necessary and proper to carry the authority given into full effect."6
The law has determined an escrow agent to be both agent and trustee." The
escrow agent's agency title pertains to the obligation and loyalty he owes to both
parties, while the trustee title refers to the "performance of an express trust" with
which he has been deposited.67 The escrow agent, as an agent, owes some
fiduciary duty to all parties of the agreement. 68 However, because of the adverse
interests involved, "[i]t is unrealistic" to compare this duty to that of a trustee
where multiple compatible -interests exist or an agent where a single interest
exists.69 One court suggests that "to call [an escrow agent] an agent of the
parties leads to confusion," and instead designated an escrow agent as a third party
whom the principal parties have entrusted specific authority via an escrow
agreement.7"
Therefore, the duties owed by an escrow agent to the principal parties are of
a limited nature.71 At a minimum, an escrow agent's duty includes an obligation
to exercise reasonable skill and ordinary diligence in following the escrow
instructions.72 There also exists a duty of loyalty, a duty to make full disclosure
and a duty to exercise a high degree of care regarding the object/money held in
escrow.73  The duty of an escrow agent to disclose information to his/her
62. SMP, Ltd. v. Syprett, Meshad, Resnick & Lieb, P.A., 584 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (court held that, absent specific provision in the escrow agreement, the escrow agent was
under no duty to sell securities held in escrow per instruction of one party to the escrow).
63. Schoepe v. Zions First National Bank, 750 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (D. Utah 1990), affid, 952
F.2d 1401 (10th Cir. 1992) (court held that bank acting as escrow agent for the sale of property had
no duty to disclose to the vendor the fact that it had made loans to the purchaser).
64. Schoepe, 750 F. Supp. at 1088; SMP, Ltd., 584 So.2d at 1054.
65. 30A C.J.S. Escrows § 10 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
66. Id
67. Id
68. Schoepe, 750 F. Supp. at 1088.
69. SMP, Ltd, 584 So.2d at 1054.
70. Id at 1054 (citing Nickell v. Reser, 57 P.2d 101, 103 (Kan. 1936)).
71. See 30A C.J.S. Escrows § 10 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
72. Id
73. Id.; SMP, Ld, 584 So.2d at 1054 (there is duty to disclose all material facts but only those
relevant to the agency, absent fraud).
[Vol. 1994, No. 2
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principals74 is limited to situations where such a duty is required by the escrow
agreement," where the information is regarding known fraud,76 and where the
information is regarding "material facts which might affect the principal's decision
as to a pending transaction."07 There is no common law duty of reasonable skill
and ordinary diligence outside the realm of the escrow agreement.78 Further,
most courts have been "hesitant to hold escrow agents liable for the full panoply
of fiduciary obligations."79
In contrast, there are courts which have attempted to expand the duties and
liabilities of an escrow agent and to eradicate the distinction between an escrow
agent and other agents.8" The court in Burkons v. Ticor Title Insurance Company
of California" expanded the escrow agent's duties to those of other agents and
applied principles of agency."2 Burkons imposed a standard on escrow agent's
duties to be one of a "reasonable escrow agent" under the circumstances.83
Critics of the Burkons Court, suggest that this objective standard is too imposing
and that courts should not engage in determining the conduct of a reasonable
escrow agent.8"
The top of this pyramid of legal history leaves us with an array of semi-
applicable case law on the topic of an escrow agent's ability to bind one of its
principals, an investor in a securities transaction, to a contract containing an
agreement to arbitrate with a third party clearing house. All of this case law is
supported by logical reasoning and important policy concerns, however, none of
it combines to answer the question at hand.
74. Some courts have refused to enforce this duty because of the possible conflict in duty to each
principal. See Lee v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 70 Cal. Rptr. 378, 379 (Cal. CL App. 1968);
Blackburn v. McCoy, 37 P.2d 153, 156 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934).
75. 30A CJ.S. Escrows § 10 (1987 & Supp. 1993); SMP, Ltd., 584 F. Supp. at 1054.
76. Berry v. McLeod, 604 P.2d 610, 616 (Az. 1979).
77. Schoepe, 750 F. Supp. at 1089.
78. SMP, Ltd, 584 So.2d at 1054.
79. Timothy J. Thomason &-Linda B. Dubnow, The Expanding Nature of the Escrow Agent's
Duties; The Judicial Pendulum has Swung Too Far, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 643, 650 (1993).
80. See Burkons v. Ticor Title Insurance Company of California, 813 Pl.d 710 (Az. 1991);
National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973).
81. 813 P.2d 710 (Az. 1991).
82. Id. at 718 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSsER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 106, at 738-39 (5th ed. 1984)).
83. Burkons, 813 P.2d. at 718.
84. Thomason, supra note 79, at 656.
1994]
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The 99 Commercial Street court found that an agreement containing an
arbitration clause signed by an escrow agent is sufficient to bind an investing
customer." The court's analysis consisted of an examination of the principles of
arbitration, escrow, and agency law. 6
A. Arbitration
The court reiterated its long-standing judicial predisposition favoring
arbitration agreements 7 and held that such agreements are "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable."8 8 However, the court also stated that parties are not required
to arbitrate absent an express agreement.8 9
Next, the court held that general principles of contract and agency law are to
be utilized in determining who is actually bound to an agreement to arbitrate.9
Judge Sotomayor, writing the memorandum order, noted that an obligation to
arbitrate does not attach merely by personal signature on an arbitration
provision.9' Further, the court stated that "ordinary contract principles determine
who is bound by such written provisions" and how a "part[y] can become
contractually bound absent their signature."9 2
B. Escrow
In this portion of the opinion, the court discussed ownership of escrow
accounts.93 First, the court restated Defendants' position that 99 Commercial
Street owned the accounts when the Customer Agreement was signed, and also
restated, Plaintiffs' assertion that the mortgagor, LCC, was the owner of the
Escrow Account at the time of the agreement." The 99 Commercial Street court
85. 811 F. Supp. at 907. The court first resolved secondary issues and held that GG & Co., as
third party beneficiary, can move to compel arbitration under an agreement such as the one in question;
and that the claims brought by Plaintiffs in this case are arbitrable if, in fact, 99 Commercial Street is
a party to the arbitration agreement. Id at 904. However, since these issues are resolved with no
discussion of applicable law and are not pertinent to the primary issue involved in this case, they will
not be dealt with in this Note.
86. Id at 904.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (quoting the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§2. (1947))).
89. Id. at 905 (citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 499 U.S. 468, 478
(1989)).
90. Id
91. Id (citing Fisser 282 F.2d at 233).
92. Id (citing Fisser, 282 F.2d at 233).
93. Id.
94. Id.
[Vol. 1994, No. 2
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held, however, that both parties are considered owners of the account regarding
acts taken by the escrow agent according to the escrow agreement.9"
After defining escrow as a written instrument entrusted to a third party agent
by a grantor for delivery to a grantee after certain conditions are met and which
is controlled by the escrow agreement,96 the court discussed allocation of losses
and ownership in an escrow situation.97 Allocation of loss is determined by the
timing of the incident causing the loss.9" If the loss is suffered "before the
condition for delivery is satisfied," it falls upon the grantor.9 On the other hand,
if the loss is incurred after the condition for delivery is satisfied, it falls on the
grantee."°  Further, following the deposit of the escrow and prior to the
fulfillment of the condition, neither party retains control or ownership over it.' ° '
The court stated that "ownership is held in stasis."' 2
Finally, the court discussed an escrow agent's fiduciary duties under the
principles of escrow law." The court stated that an escrow agent "must follow
the instructions of the parties,""' and "is bound to take whatever steps are
necessary to fulfill its duties."' ' Judge Sotomayor stated that an escrow agent
is an agent for, and on behalf of, both parties involved."°  Finally, the court
held that an agreement entered into by an escrow agent pursuant to the escrow
agreement or the instructions of the parties is "valid and enforceable."
0 7
C. Agency
In this third section of the decision, the court discussed the final question of
whether it was within the escrow agent's duties and authority to bind Plaintiffs to
the Customer Agreement.0 8 The court found, according to general principles
of agency, that an agent "with proper authority can enter into contracts with third
persons on behalf of their principals."'" Further, the court stated that, according
to New York law, this authority can be express, implied or apparent if it is
"reasonable from the circumstances surrounding the transaction."" °
95. Id.
96. Id.
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105. Id (citing Helman v. Dixon, 338 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (N.Y. Civ. CL 1972)).
106. Id.
107. Id (citing 30A CJ.S. Escrows §10 (1987 & Supp. 1993)).
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From this analysis, the court reached the decision that the escrow agents in
99 Commercial Street did act in accordance with their duties and bound all parties
involved to the arbitration agreement which they signed.' Because Plaintiffs
were aware that all monies involved would be sent through Bear Steams for
investment into the recommended funds and because a customer agreement
containing an arbitration clause with the clearing house is not unusual in the
ordinary course of a securities business, the court held that the acts of the escrow
agents in executing the Customer Agreement were "eminently reasonable and fully
within the scope of [their] duties.""' According to Judge Sotomayer, the escrow
agents had both express and apparent authority to act on behalf of and bind 99
Commercial Street to the Customer Agreement." 3
V. COMMENT
The determination of this case rests on the issue of whether an escrow agent's
powers should include the ability to bind one of its principals to an agreement
containing an arbitration provision. The court's analysis was not fully reasoned
to reach the correct decision on this issue. Although agreements to arbitrate are
favored by public policy and should be encouraged, finding that a party is bound
to such an agreement cannot be done without a thorough analysis of the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract and a certain degree of
specificity as to that party's intentions and expectations.
Historically, courts have held that agreements to arbitrate must be entered
into with complete consent by both parties involved.'" Consequently, courts
cannot require a party to submit to arbitration absent a finding of such
agreement.' Since courts use contract principals to interpret agreements to
arbitrate, they may bind parties without an express agreement or signature.
However, where this occurs, courts find some consent, through the use of contract
principles, with which a party is bound to arbitrate disputes pursuant to
agreement."' For example, courts have found the necessary consent in
situations where: (1) there is a disclosed agent of one of the parties to the contract
wishing to compel arbitration;"17 (2) a party intended by both principals to
benefit from the performance of the contract as a third party beneficiary who
wishes to compel arbitration;'. (3) one of the parties to the contract containing




114. Continental Group, 873 F.2d at 617.
115. United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960);
McAllister Bros., 621 F.2d at 522.
116. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
117. Nesslage, 823 F.2d at 233.
118. Cauble v. Mabon Nugent and Co., 594 F. Supp. 985, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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who should have realized he would be bound to submit to arbitration;" 9 (4) an
action by an employee of a party to the agreement which is the subject of the
arbitration constitutes an action of the principal; 2 0 and (5) there is a long term




In 99 Commercial Street, however, the court is attempting to fimd consent
through the actions of an escrow agent. This escrow agent's sole duty was to keep
money while certain conditions were being resolved between a mortgagor and a
mortgagee. Where the subject of an escrow agreement is specified and an escrow
agent acts outside the scope of, or not in furtherance of that agreement, his actions
should not be deemed as consented to by the parties to the escrow agreement.
In addition, some courts refuse to enforce contracts containing arbitration
provisions signed by brokers for investors absent a greater showing that the
investor intended to be bound.22  These courts find that: (1) an arbitration
provision is not "an 'obvious' (and hence, intended) incident" of a broker's
powers; 23 (2) there is a lack of intent to allow a nonsignatory broker to enforce
a contract containing such a provision; 24 or (3) there is a lack of intent to confer
a benefit to a third party beneficiary. 2 Similarly, there is an absence of intent
in 99 Commercial Street to give the escrow agent the power to bind the investor
to a contract containing an arbitration provision.
Resolving legal disputes by arbitration involves important procedural rights,
or lack thereof, including the right to a trial. This right is relinquished if a party
is forced to submit a dispute to arbitration. Courts are correct to search for some
finding of intent to be bound, before allowing an escrow agent to relinquish such
an important right on behalf of her principal. Therefore, a definite showing of
intent should be required in any case containing a question as to whether there was
an agreement to arbitrate, such as the case at hand.
Finally, and most importantly, escrow agents are different from other types
of agents and should, therefore, be treated differently with respect to the powers
which they possess. 26 The 99 Commercial Street court gives an escrow agent
the unlimited power to contract on behalf of its principals, which was probably
never contemplated by either party. The duties owed by an escrow agent to a
principal are and should be limited. Because of the nature of the agency
relationship involved, an escrow agent's loyalties are divided between principals
and the interests of each of those parties are often competing. For this reason, an
escrow agent's duties to his principal are less than that of an ordinary agent. They
119. Id.
120. Scher, 723 F. Supp. at 216.
121. Okcuoglu, 580 F.Supp. at 751.
122. See supra., notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
123. Schaffer, 756 F. Supp. at 369.
124. Lester, 676 F.Supp. at 484.
125. Id. at 485.
126. See supra, notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
1994]
13
Martin: Martin: Court Lets Go of the Reins:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
are derived from, defined by, and limited to the escrow agreement and its
corresponding instructions. Similar to his duties to a principal, an escrow agent's
power to act on behalf of a principal should stem from the escrow agreement
and/or the nature of the escrow. An escrow agent's powers, therefore, should be
limited as well. Unless an action taken by an escrow agent on behalf of a
principal is part of the specified escrow agreement or its correlating instructions,
or is implicit in the nature of the escrow, it should be held to be outside of an
escrow agent's powers. Where an important issue, such as binding a party to an
agreement to arbitrate a dispute, is involved, unauthorized and unintended escrow
agent actions should not be binding on the principal parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
Undeniably, agreements to arbitrate disputes should be encouraged and
supported. However, the interpretation of an agreement to arbitrate and an action
to compel arbitration on a party involved in a dispute, who is a nonsignatory to
the agreement is a delicate issue involving a possible loss of procedural rights.
Here, this issue is also complicated by an action on behalf of one of the parties by
an agent who, arguably, does not possess such authority to act. The court did not
make a sufficient inquiry into these issues, particularly the limited powers of
escrow agents which is necessary to hold that escrow agents possess the power to
bind parties to arbitration agreements. The holding in this case not only defies the
theory that a party should not be bound to arbitrate without agreement; it could
dangerously lead to an empowerment of an escrow agent to act for a principal in
any capacity despite the inherent limitations of an escrow agent's authority.
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